Strickland's Unconventional Conventional Approach to Adesanya

Looking at Israel Adesanya vs. Sean Strickland

Sean Strickland became the new middleweight king at UFC 293, which took place in Sydney, Australia. In many sportsbooks, Strickland was a near -700 underdog, yet he clearly won four out of the five rounds, and the one round that went for champion Israel Adesanya was close. The calculus for Adesanya being the heavy favorite was simple: Adesanya is bigger, has a longer reach, better chin, more power, and has beaten better opponents. Strickland also fought two months ago and suffered a gruesome eye poke. It only made sense to make Strickland the heavy underdog.

The Power of Simplicity: The Teep, the One-Two, and Gaze

Yet Strickland won a straightforward unanimous decision. How did he do it? With a teep, a one-two, and an unwavering gaze. The teep is the first technique we teach in LMA because it's simple, easy to do, has the longest reach, and has various uses. A concept we've adopted from basketball is that it's better to have a few moves for a million situations rather than a million moves for a million situations.

The Art of Perception: Training Your Eyes

One fundamental concept in LMA is perception. It entails opening your eyes and responding to what you see rather than what you think you'll see. The fight never felt like Adesanya was fighting a more technical fighter, but it did seem like, for the first time, he was fighting someone who had sparred more than him. Strickland didn't see what Adesanya wanted him to see; he saw the reality before him, and that comes not only from many hours of sparring but also from recognizing that what you train in sparring is perception.

Strickland didn't see Alex Pereira's left hook, so he went to spar with Pereira to gain more reads. It doesn't matter if Pereira shows him how he did what he did because having that information isn't the same as perceiving it coming. Strickland trusts his sense for fighting, which is why he always mentions his fighting experience. Even when he was eye-poked by Abusupiyan Magomedov, he had a sense for where Magomedov would be and what he would do. It wasn't Strickland's first rodeo. In fact, Strickland has had an uncountable number of rodeos.

Breaking Down the Fight: Image by Image

Sticking with perception, I can't read Adesanya's mind or know what was happening in his camp. The same is true for Strickland. All I know is what I saw in that fight, and this is what I saw:

As soon as the fight began, Adesanya pumped a hip feint. Despite Adesanya's reputation as the "Stylebender," he operates from a striking toolbox. His toolbox just happens to be much bigger than his opponents'. Strickland, however, wasn't looking at Adesanya's legs but at Adesanya.

When Adesanya threw a teep to the body, Strickland caught it. Strickland uses his hands to constantly neutralize his opponents' strikes. Adesanya relies on footwork and upper body movement to avoid strikes and rarely uses his hands defensively other than to shell up when he's hurt.

When a body kick came, Strickland parried it. 30 seconds in, and Strickland doesn't bite on Adesanya's main feint, his hips. When Adesanya kicked to the body, Strickland caught it or parried it.

When Adesanya used his footwork to try and fool Strickland, Strickland didn't look at his feet and kept his gaze glued on Adesanya and only reacted when Adesanya committed to a direction.

With his body kicks being parried or caught, Adesanya began to spam calf kicks and high kicks, which became predictable and easy for Strickland to block. Even when blocking a low kick, Strickland wasn't looking at Adesanya's legs, closing his eyes, or losing focus; his gaze remained on Adesanya. He knew he'd see a kick coming without looking at his legs because he'd already seen a million kicks in training. He avoided guesswork and reacted to what he saw, not what he didn't.

Something Eric Nicksick, Strickland's coach, previously pointed out about Adesanya is that if you can close off one of his exits, he'll exit the other way. (Check out MMAI Analytics's prescient video on Eric Nicksick and Israel Adesanya.) Adesanya is known for drawing out reactions from his opponents, but what if they try to draw out reactions from Adesanya? Strickland put this theory to the test. He threw a left jab, not even intending to land it but to test Adesanya's reaction.

Adesanya indeed moved in the opposite direction, as Nicksick predicted. Strickland watched Adesanya escape and saw that Nicksick's hypothesis was correct. He didn't throw a blind follow-up shot expecting the theory to be accurate; he watched to see what would happen. His eyes saw Adesanya go the other way. If Adesanya did it again, Strickland would see it even faster because he already has experience seeing it. It's not about anticipation but making a quicker read. The more you see something, the better you get at seeing it.

Furthermore, Strickland wanted to avoid Adesanya getting a read on the potential follow-up or his own predictability. Strickland wanted to condition Adesanya for this response.

With the kicks not being effective from distance, and since Strickland was not rushing in or reacting to hip feints, Adesanya lunged in with jabs, which Strickland saw and countered.

Adesanya threw a body kick, and Strickland caught it again. He saw the kick coming. It's much easier to react to something you see rather than what you think you'll see. Strickland was reacting to what he saw. It's not magic; it's just that Adesanya's opponents often try to go beyond what they see or anticipate Adesanya walking onto their strikes based on zero visual evidence.

Strickland held onto the leg until they reached the cage and then let Adesanya go. He was composed, not intimidated. You rush if you feel like you can only win on a fluke or a single opportunity despite there being the rest of the fight to win. Strickland was taking his time and reacting to what he saw as a solvable problem. If you're intimidated, you react as if every play is your last.

Strickland used his hands as obstacles in the flight path of Adesanya's strikes. He would often grab Adesanya's hands or wrists because he developed a sense for their trajectory, and this was still two minutes into the fight.

Adesanya's gaze wasn't as fixed as Strickland's. He often turns his head, looking at his opponent with one eye (reducing his perception) to bait an attack while loading a counter. Since Adesanya doesn't block and relies on upper body movement, Strickland faked a jab. Adesanya turned his head and leaned back, and then Strickland landed his actual jab. Compare Strickland's gaze to Adesanya's. Strickland isn't fast, but he showed you don't have to be against Adesanya. You just have to look at where he's going (aim) before you fire.

Testing the theory again. Strickland's repeated jabs prompted Adesanya to move away from them, providing Strickland with more valuable experience.

To counter Adesanya's feints and upper body movements, Strickland utilized the teep—a strike with exceptional reach. When Adesanya leaned into it, he paid the price. You can see the breath leaving Adesanya. Unlike Strickland, Adesanya doesn't parry kicks to leave his hands free to counter.

After that moment, whenever Strickland lifted his leg to feint a teep, Adesanya reacted and moved away. Since the teep is the jab of the legs, it was the perfect compliment to Strickland's style. Attack with the limbs closest to your opponent and use your rear to defend if you fuck up. The teep is a great tool and teaches you various theories and skills for other aspects of fighting, and that's why it's the first strike I teach.

When Adesanya ran onto the fence again to avoid the teep, Strickland stayed composed and took his time. He felt confident staying this close to the dangerous Adesanya, who had previously knocked out Pereira from this position, because Strickland trusted his vision and his defense. When he wanted to inch defensively, he narrowed his body, reducing the targets, and covered his vitals. His hand position allowed him to block and grab strikes. Most importantly, his eyes were fixed on Adesanya. His first line of defense was seeing the strike coming. Sparring is to a fighter what batting practice is to a hitter—you need to see a lot of throws to get a sense for pitches. Since Adesanya's punches come from low to high, they're easier to see than something coming straight down the eye line.

This exemplifies how simple yet complex Strickland was in this fight. His right hand was in the path of Adesanya's rear straight. He leaned away from the punch, grabbed Adesanya's right wrist, and kicked him to the body as he leaned back. All while keeping his gaze firm on Adesanya. It's much easier to be complex with a simple game than to take a complex system and make it even more complicated. Juggling with two hands is easier than juggling with hands and feet. It didn't matter how complex Adesanya was with his hands if his core always stayed in place. Eric Nicksick even told Strickland to punch his chest because Adesanya's head might be moving, but his chest will be there, which will often have you finding the chin. This is the same advice Ray Longo gave Chris Weidman in his similar upset victory over Anderson Silva. In the promotion of this fight, there were many comparisons between Israel Adesanya and Anderson Silva.

Strickland sometimes grabbed Adesanya's jab hand with both hands because Adesanya left it out there looking for a reaction. Adesanya got a reaction but not the one he was expecting. In hindsight, however, isn't the obvious thing to do to an outstretched arm is grab it, especially since this is MMA?

Strickland threw a jab, and Adesanya moved away from it.

Strickland caught him with the right straight, which Adesanya walked onto. In the picture, Strickland is clearly looking at Adesanya as he's punching rather than punching where he thinks he will be.

Adesanya reacted by covering up, including his own eyes, and leaned into the fence. Strickland responded by staying composed and watching Adesanya. Instead of rushing, he inched.

Adesanya tried to escape while throwing a blind jab. Strickland saw it and slipped it while landing his own.

Adesanya often leaves his lead arm outstretched in fights. Strickland, however, grabbed it with both hands and pulled him into a teep.

Adesanya pulled away. Strickland let go and landed another right straight. He saw where Adesanya's head was before throwing the punch rather than throwing and expecting him to be there.

Strickland had hurt Adesanya several times already, but rather than expecting Adesanya to be there to be hit or be set up for a hasty finish, Strickland watched and reacted to what he saw, not what he thought he would see. He was fighting in the present and not in the future. Not twelve moves ahead, but the first available move.

Strickland landed a jab, which Adesanya failed to see.

Adesanya exited and threw a lean-back hook, anticipating where Strickland's head would be, much as he did against Robert Whittaker, Paulo Costa, and Alex Pereira. But Strickland was not going to trade hooks with Adesanya because he doesn't throw hooks, he throws one-twos. He tracked Adesanya and landed a right straight. Strickland technically beat Adesanya to the punch, but Adesanya's punch wasn't going to land anyway because he wasn't looking where he was throwing. Even if he were, a straight punch will beat a looping hook.

Furthermore, throwing the rear straight means your arm and shoulder become a natural barrier to the hook. Look at Strickland's sight line in the picture; he's looking at his target while throwing the right rather than anticipating where Adesanya will be. He's tracking Adesanya, but just that much faster.

Adesanya was dropped, not due to Strickland's power but the collision itself. Adesanya blindly ran his face into the punch, and since he didn't see it, he couldn't brace for it. Strickland was only looking to hit him, not set up a knockdown. Adesanya caused his own knockdown with his failed counter.

Now was the time to go after Adesanya.

But as a testament to Adesanya's chin, even while getting hit twenty times, he was still able to recover. Strickland maintained his composure and watched Adesanya. Being really close to someone limits your vision. If you back away, you see everything. Strickland knew not to give up his vision looking for a finish, and prioritized being able to see his opponent over hastiness. Pereira did the opposite in his rematch with Adesanya, which Strickland drew lessons from.

The fight returned to open space, and Strickland gave Adesanya space because Adesanya was still dangerous. Rushing in means you can't see, and Adesanya can trick you in those situations, and there was the rest of the fight to win. However, Strickland didn't lose anything important because his gaze and control of the fight remained unbroken.

The Unconventional Conventional Victory

And that is how the rest of the fight went. Strickland's victory was unconventional because of how conventional it was. Strickland fought like you're supposed to as a world-class professional fighter: measured, simple, and eyes on the target. It was only masterful due to many others not fighting like that, especially at middleweight and above. MMA sees itself as a disruptor in both sports and martial arts, so it often dives right into the trees and skips over the forest. Yet perception, the one-two, and the teep, those three things done well shut out a million other things.

Flash and feints work insofar as they distort perception. If they don't and the opponent sees everything, they take up a lot of time and space and have you use up energy and give up ground. It's not that Adesanya has a habit of walking back onto the fence. Backing up is a byproduct of his flash and feints not working. When they work, it's the opponent who backs up, rushes in, reaches, or stays in place while Adesanya dances all over them.

If Adesanya is "figured out," it'll be different from Anderson Silva or Dominick Cruz being figured out because it won't just be an individual fighter being deconstructed but the whole City Kickboxing system. As improvisational as Adesanya seemed, once you saw more City Kickboxing fighters, you saw that there were set gym behaviors and patterns. It looks improvisational because it's complicated when it's more the memorization of a complex system of movement, which still relies on recall. But if their fighters can memorize it, so can an opposing camp.

✊✊✊

(I write daily about martial arts and other topics from a liberatory perspective. If you like my work, upgrade your subscription. You can also support me on Patreon or make a one-time donation on Ko-fi. Find Southpaw at its website. Get the swag on Spring. Also check out Liberation Martial Arts Online.)